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Abstract
It is well known that investor sentiment affects the aggregate stock market behavior.
This paper investigates the economic link between investor sentiment, measured by
results of the FIFA World Cup, and US sectoral stock returns. We find that sport
sentiment is priced only in the financial sector while other sectors do not significantly
react to changes in the investor sentiment. We argue that this result might be ex-
plained by the high liquidity that makes the financial sector more attractive to foreign
investors who in turn are more prone to sport sentiment than local investors in the US.
Accordingly, an arbitrageur can build a profitable trading strategy by selling short the
financial sector during the FIFA World cup periods and buying it back afterwards.
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1 Introduction
An increasing number of empirical works suggests that investor sentiment has strong effects
on asset prices. In these studies, different empirical measures of investor sentiment have
been proposed. For instance, Saunders (1993) and Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) consider
sentiment effects driven by meteorological conditions. Kamstra et al. (2003) analyze the
implication of seasonal effective diseases on asset prices while Bollena et al. (2011) propose
to measure sentiment by using Twitter feeds. Edmans et al. (2007), Palomino et al. (2009),
Kaplanski and Levy (2010a), Kaplanski and Levy (2010b), Kaplanski and Levy (2012) and
Kaplanski and Levy (2014) measure investor sentiment using soccer results. Brown and Cliff
(2004), Brown and Cliff (2005) and Lux (2011) identify sentiment using survey measures.
Cao and Wei (2005) investigate the relation between stock market returns and temperature
while Yuan et al. (2006) consider moon phases as a possible determinant of investor sentiment
and study their impact on asset prices. Da et al. (2015) build an index of investors’ fear
using internet search volume.
The empirical asset pricing literature typically studies the effect of different mood vari-
ables (i.e., variables capturing meteorological conditions, seasonal diseases, sport outcomes,
etc.) on aggregate stock returns. However, it is reasonable to assume that different investors
are prone to different kind of sentiment. To the extent that different investors have different
preferences for stocks trading, we expect that a given mood variable captures a particular
relationship between sentiment and prices that is stronger for some stocks (or sectors) than
other. In fact, Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue that investors ”simply demand stocks that
have the bundle of salient characteristics compatible with their sentiment”.
2
Motivated by these observations we ask ourselves whether different US sectors are affected
differently by investor sentiment. As a measure of investor sentiment we use results of World
Cup games as in Kaplanski and Levy (2010a). We find a significant sentiment effect only for
the financial industry while other sectors do not react significantly to changes in the investors’
sport sentiment. To investigate the economic reasons behind this result we classify the US
sectors according to different measures of liquidity and we find that the financials sector is
consistently one of the most (if not the most) liquid sectors in our sample. To the extent
that the sentiment effect is mainly induced by foreign investors, as suggested by Kaplanski
and Levy (2010a), our finding is consistent with the observed preference of foreign investors
for more liquid stocks (Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001)). Thus, one way to interpret our
results in light of the argument of Baker and Wurgler (2006) is that foreign investors demand
more financial stocks because their salient characteristic (i.e., high liquidity) is compatible
with sport sentiment.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the background for
our analysis; Section 3 describes our econometric approach; Section 4 presents the results
of our regression analysis; Section 5 illustrates a trading strategy that exploits the effect of
sport sentiment; Section 6 concludes.
2 Background and Motivation
We seek to test the hypothesis that different sectors are affected differently by investor
sentiment. Chen et al. (2013) analyse the effect of optimism and pessimism on stock returns
of 11 Asian countries during the period 1996-2010. They find that sectoral stock returns
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react in different ways to local sentiment (measured as turnover by volume in local stock
markets) and global sentiment (measured as turnover by volume in global stock markets).
Similarly, Huang et al. (2014) build proxies for investor pessimism and optimism and find
that optimism affects stock returns in most (but not all) US industries while pessimism has
no effect on sectoral stock returns. Uygur and Tas (2014) use weekly trading volume of
Istanbul Stock Exchange 100 as a proxy for investor sentiment and show that sentiment has
a greater influence on industry, banking, and food and beverage sectors than on other sectors
in Turkey. Admittedly, this literature is still fragmented to draw an educated conclusion.
However, these results suggest that – despite investor sentiment being shown to affect the
behavior of the aggregate stock market – it is plausible that this effect originates from
individual sectors and then spills over to the entire market.
3 Data and Methodology
We employ Datastream Global Equity Indices (DGEI). In particular, we retrieve our ten
sectoral stock indexes from level 2 of DGEI which divides the market into the following
sectors: Basic Materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Financials, Health Care,
Industrials, Oil & Gas, Technology, Telecommunications and Utilities.1 Our sample covers
10,958 trading days, from January 1973 to December 2014.2 We compute continuously
compounded day-to-day percentage returns and summarize their descriptive statistics in
Table 1 below.
1The use of DGEI represents a ubiquitous practice in empirical studies of international financial markets
focused mainly on sectors (see, among others, Baca et al. (2000), Griffin and Stulz (2001), Brooks and Negro
(2004), Nandha and Faff (2008), Donadelli and Paradiso (2014) and Donadelli and Persha (2014)).
2Notice that our sample is consistent with the analysis carried out by Edmans et al. (2007) who collect
international soccer results from January 1973 through December 2004.
4
Table 1: Sector Returns
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic BM CG CS F HC I OG T TC U
Mean 0.0361 0.0317 0.0358 0.0387 0.0444 0.0405 0.0427 0.0355 0.0354 0.0374
Med 0.0158 0.017 0.0295 0.0234 0.0311 0.0203 0.0209 0.0208 0.0241 0.0356
Max 14.506 9.031 10.979 13.519 11.444 9.298 17.335 15.699 13.28 13.408
Min -22.297 -22.64 -22.915 -18.194 -19.29 -21.405 -22.212 -24.492 -19.925 -14.214
StDev 1.3708 1.1529 1.1926 1.3288 1.0279 1.1992 1.3908 1.5751 1.2032 0.9076
Skew -0.733 -0.7819 -0.7363 -0.3729 -0.6834 -0.758 -0.5516 -0.2298 -0.31 -0.2594
Kurt 18.791 21.054 21.155 22.681 20.6 17.976 18.583 13.233 18.096 22.674
J-B 114818 149914 151447 177070 142257 103428 111413 47902 104207 176815
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
MV 244,032 405,110 871,743 1,165,593 1,020,932 672,003 591,237 1,014,340 284,455 261,923
Obs 10956 10956 10956 10956 10956 10956 10956 10956 10956 10956
Panel B: Correlations
BM CG CS F HC I OG T TC U
Basic Materials 1.00
Consumer Goods 0.72 1.00
Consumer Services 0.76 0.80 1.00
Financials 0.73 0.68 0.79 1.00
Health Care 0.69 0.70 0.79 0.71 1.00
Industrials 0.82 0.78 0.86 0.81 0.77 1.00
Oil & Gas 0.69 0.54 0.58 0.56 0.58 0.63 1.00
Technology 0.62 0.66 0.76 0.64 0.62 0.76 0.48 1.00
Telecommunications 0.57 0.59 0.66 0.63 0.61 0.66 0.47 0.59 1.00
Utilities 0.60 0.56 0.58 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.59 0.44 0.57 1.00
Notes: Panel A summarizes the descriptive statistics (mean, median, maximum, minimum, standard deviation, skewness,
kurtosis, and the Jarque-Bera statistic) of continuously compounded day-to-day percentage returns on 10 stock market sectors
in the United States. BM = Basic Materials, CG = Consumer Goods, CS = Consumer Services, F = Financials, HC = Health
Care, I = Industrials, OG = Oil & Gas, T = Technology, TC = Telecommunications, U = Utilities. Market value (MV) is
displayed in million units of local currency (i.e., US$). Panel B reports the correlation between sectoral stock market returns.
Data are from DGEI and run from 01/01/1973 to 12/31/2014.
The empirical methodology is based on Kaplanski and Levy (2010a). Our sample includes
11 FIFA World Cups, with a total of 234 event effect days (EED) and 255 event period effect
days (EPED) defined as follows: EED accounts for match days – which are also trading days
– and the subsequent trading days;3 EPED covers the whole World Cup period, beginning
on the day of the first match and continuing until the first day after the final match. The
break days before the final game, plus two additional trading days are also included4.
3This is based on Edmans et al. (2007) who suggest that the local effect of a soccer game occurs the
day after the game ends. We also implement tests when only days after the games are considered as EED.
Results are almost identical and available upon request. The day of the game is included for the following
reason: depending on where the games are hosted, the US market may still be open when the game ends.
For all those games played during the week-end we assume they could have an effect on Monday (or the first
available trading day).
4The data for the World Cup are taken from www.worldcup-history.com.
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Our null hypothesis is thus that the US stock market – in each sector – is efficient and
does not allow for exploitable arbitrage. The alternative hypothesis is that the World Cup
effect – captured by EED and EPED – is statistically significant. We test the null hypothesis
– for each sector – using the following regression model:5
Rst = δ0 +
2∑
i=1
δ1,iR
s
t−i +
4∑
i=1
δ2,iDi,t + δ3Tt + δ4Pt + δ5HBt + δ6Ht + δ7Et +
2∑
i=1
δ8,iJi,t + ut
(1)
where Rst is the daily return of sector s; δ0 is a constant; R
s
t−i is the previous ith day
rate of return. Di,t, with i = 1, 2, 3, 4, are dummy variables for the days of the week from
Monday to Thursday, Tt is a dummy variable for the first five days of the taxation year, Pt
is a dummy variable capturing the annual event period, HBt is a dummy taking a value of
one if the US soccer team wins a match and zero otherwise, Ht is a dummy variable for days
after non-weekend holidays, and Et stands for event days. In addition, Ji,t, with i = 1, 2 are
dummy variables for the 10 days with the lowest (i = 1) and highest (i = 2) returns in our
sample. Finally, ut is the error term.
4 Regression Results
To study the relationship between stock returns and sport sentiment we follow the procedure
illustrated by Kaplanski and Levy (2010a). First, we estimate Eq. (1) using an OLS regres-
sion (Tables 2). To address potential heteroskedasticity issues we repeat the test assuming
5A similar methodology can be found in Kamstra et al. (2003) and Edmans et al. (2007).
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that the variance of the error term follows a GARCH (1,1) process. By inspection of Table
2 we observe that the EED dummy variable has a negative effect on stock returns. The be-
havioral argument for this result is the following: investors enter a state of bad mood on the
day after the team they support loses a match and they decide to sell stocks, thus, inducing
stock returns to decrease. However, this effect is significant only for the Financials and the
Telecommunications sectors.6 The sentiment effect is even more evident when we control
for heteroskedasticity. From Figure 1 we observe that the p-value for the significance test of
the sentiment coefficient (δ7) is close to zero for all models applied to the Financials sector.
For the Consumption Goods sector and the Telecommunications sector the p-value is close
to zero only for some regression specifications but is relatively large for other specifications.
For other sectors the sentiment coefficient is not significant supporting our claim that those
sectors are not affected by sport sentiment.7
We then turn to the relationship between sport sentiment and liquidity.8 Entries in Table
3 suggest that the Financials sector has the second highest level of liquidity as measured
by annual turnover by volume and average turnover by volume.9 This suggests that sport
sentiment affects liquid sectors more than illiquid sectors. After all, if investors enter a state
of bad mood on the day after a match, it is reasonable to believe they may not want to sell
stocks at a low price and, for this reason, they prefer to stay away from illiquid markets.
6The use of the EPED dummy gives rise to similar results. Estimates are reported in the appendix
available on the authors’ website.
7Note that the scale of the y axis is inverted so that high p-values are plotted at the bottom of the Figure
and low p-values at the top.
8A body of literature on behavioral finance is persuasive of the relation between investor sentiment and
stock market liquidity. In this regard, Tetlock (2007) finds that (i) unusually high or low levels of investor
pessimism predict high market trading volume and (ii) high levels of media pessimism predict downward
pressure on market prices.
9If one excludes the Dot.Com period (i.e.,1997-2000) the Financials sector becomes the most liquid sector
in our sample.
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Cross-Industry Sentiment Effect
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Figure 1: Regression results. Notes: This Figure reports the p-values associated to the sentiment
coefficient, δ7, obtained from twelve different regression specifications for each sector. Estimates for all the
other coefficients are reported in the appendix available on the authors’ website. Spec. 1: linear model with
event effect days only; Spec. 2: GARCH model with event effect days only; Spec. 3: linear model without
serial correlation and event effect days; Spec. 4: GARCH model without serial correlation and event effect
days; Spec. 5: Linear model with serial correlation and event effect days; Spec 6: GARCH model with serial
correlation and event effect days; Spec. 7: linear model with event period effect days only; Spec. 8 : GARCH
model with event period effect days only; Spec. 9: linear model without serial correlation and event period
effect days; Spec 10: GARCH model without serial correlation and event period effect days; Spec. 11: linear
model with serial correlation and event period effect days; Spec. 12: GARCH model with serial correlation
and event period effect days.
We also estimate the multiple linear regression model that features the EED dummy for
the last two World Cups (2010 and 2014). The efficient market hypothesis suggests that
the stock market behavior should diminish the scope of profitable trading strategy over time
(Kaplanski and Levy (2014)). Indeed, for the Financials sector, the EED dummy does not
exert a significant effect on stock returns. This finding agrees with Kaplanski and Levy
(2014) who report similar results for the 2010 World Cup. To test whether the relationship
9
Table 3: Summary table
End-of-period Ann. out-PRFM Sharpe Ann. Turnover Avg Turnover
Portfolio out-PRFM value over Ratio by by Volume
of 100 USD Benchmark (%) Volume Growth (%) over Market Value
Basic Materials 266.1 0.336 2.79 2.1 0.13
Consumer Goods 487.1 0.422 3.42 3.4 0.12
Consumer Services 594.3 0.422 3.5 4.1 0.14
Financials 1201.7 0.796 3.36 5.5 0.14
Health Care -152.1 -0.045 4.62 2.7 0.08
Industrials 451.8 0.241 3.68 3.3 0.09
Oil & Gas 487.9 0.34 3.18 4.3 0.08
Technology 138.3 0.209 2.49 6.6 0.22
Telecommunications 626 0.613 3.24 4.2 0.14
Utilities 172.3 0.091 4.49 1.5 0.11
NYSE Composite 181.4 0.361 2.9
S&P500 173.8 0.355 2.81
Notes: This table summarizes the performance of sell-and-hold trading strategies for the Basic Materials,
Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Financials, Health Care, Industrials, Oil & Gas, Technology, Telecom-
munications, Utilities, NYSE Composite and S&P500 stock indices. Annualized percentage end-of-period
outperformance and Sharpe ratio are used to evaluate the performance of trading strategies. The end-of-
period outperformance value of a given trading strategy is the difference between the sell-and-hold strategy
for each portfolio and and its respective long-only benchmark investment of 100 USD. The Sharpe-Ratio is
defined as the mean return of the sell-and-hold strategy over its standard deviation. A 0.5% transaction
cost for getting in or out of the market is included. The last two columns report two liquidity measures.
Annualized turnover by volume growth reports the annualized growth rate of turnover by volume for each
long-only benchmark portfolio. The last column presents turnover by volume divided by market market
capitalization averaged over the sample period.
between sport sentiment and stock returns depends on the US being the hosting country or
not, we repeat the analysis by focusing only on the 1994 World Cup. For this particular year
we find weaker evidence of the sentiment effect.10 Finally, for the sake of completeness we
repeat the analysis for Germany, Italy and the UK. We find evidence of a sport sentiment
effect for sectors different than Financials. For the UK the relevant sector is Oil & Gas,
for Germany Healthcare and Telecommunications while for Italy the relevant sectors are
Consumer Services and Health Care. This result is in line with the main hypothesis that
sport sentiment in the US market is mainly driven by foreign investors (also because soccer
is not very popular among local investors in the US).11 Instead, European markets have
10This could be due to the fact that hosting the World Cup stimulates aggregate investment that has
a positive effect on the aggregate stock market, thus neutralizing (partially) the negative sport sentiment
effect.
11See Kaplanski and Levy (2010a) for a detailed discussion of these arguments.
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a lower fraction of foreign investors and, at the same time, soccer is very popular among
local investors. For these reasons, sport sentiment may affect different investors (i.e., local
investors) and, thus, different sectors such as Oil & Gas.12 A possible future research topic
would be to understand the salient characteristic that makes those sectors compatible with
the sport sentiment of local investors in Europe.
5 Exploiting Cross-Sector World Cup Effects
Based on the empirical evidence reported in the previous section we seek to build a profitable
trading strategy. We assume that an investor who invests in a particular sector is willing to
reallocate her wealth to the 3 month T-Bill rate during a World Cup period (i.e., underweight
the sector). Differently, when no World Cup is taking place, the investor keeps her wealth
invested in the sector portfolio. Figure 2 (panel A) depicts the cumulative outperformance
of this trading strategy over its respective benchmark portfolio (i.e., a long-only position
in a particular sector over a period from 01.01.1974 to 31.12.2014). Following Kaplanski
and Levy (2010a), we assume transaction costs of 0.5%. For illustration purposes we report
only Financials, the average across the remaining nine sectors, the NYSE Composite and
the S&P 500. However, on a sector-by-sector comparison Financials still exhibit the highest
cumulative outperformance. Panel B depicts the cumulative return of each sector averaged
across all World Cup games taken place between 1973 and 2014.13 Finally, in panel C we
report the average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around the first match day for
12This is also in line with the result of Edmans et al. (2007).
13Since the length of the eleven World Cup periods varies from 20 to 26 days, we depict the average
strategy performance for the first 20 days.
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the Financials sector and the average across all remaining sectors.
Panel A: Cumulative Outperformance
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Figure 2: Exploiting the World Cup Effect. Notes: Panel A depicts the cumulative outperformance of the Financials
sector in excess of its benchmark portfolio. The Financials trading portfolio invests 100% in the Financials sector during
non-World Cup days but reduces its exposure during World Cup periods. During the World Cup, it has a 0% exposure to the
Financials sector and 100% exposure to the 3m T-Bills. The benchmark portfolio for Financials, is the sector itself, i.e. 100%
Financials over the whole period from 01.01.1974 - 31.12.2014. The outperformance is the difference between the Financials
trading portfolio and the Financials benchmark portfolio. The same strategy is applied to all other sectors, the NYSE Composite
Index and the S&P500. The cumulative outperformance is averaged across sectors excluding Financials. Transaction costs of
0.5% for getting in or out of the market are included. Panel B depicts the average cumulative performance of the ten sectors
and the benchmark indices S&P 500 and NYSE Composite. The investment strategy is a simple short position taken in a sector
or benchmark portfolio at the beginning of a World Cup period and held until its end. The length of the eleven World Cup
periods under consideration varies from 20 to 26 days. This figure depicts the average strategy performance during the first 20
days. Panel C depicts the average cumulative residuals around the first matchday (t = 0) for the Financials sector (red line)
and the average across the remaining nine sectors (blue-diamond line). The residual on day t is calculated as the difference
between observed rate of return and the ex-post expected rate of return on day t. The one-factor capital asset pricing model
rt = α + βrm,t + t, where rt is the sector return and rm,t is the S&P 500 return, is estimated using a 252-day estimation
window.
These three performance indicators clearly depict that underweighting the Financials
sector during the World Cup games leads to superior returns as opposed to a simple long-
only strategy in the same sector.14 When considering the whole US market, as proxied
14Note that even after the Financial crisis in 2008 the underweighting strategy is most profitable among
all sectors and yields an annualized outperformance of 0.796%.
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by NYSE Composite and S&P 500, the underweighting strategy yields a positive overall
cumulative return, but smaller than the return obtained by using the strategy based on the
Financials sector only.
6 Concluding Remarks
Does investor sentiment spread evenly across different industrial sectors? In this paper we
use international soccer results to study the effect of investors’ sentiment on US industrial
sectors. We find that sport sentiment affects mainly the Financials sector but not other
sectors. Based on this result, we develop a simple and profitable trading strategy to exploit
the sectoral sentiment effect. We argue that the sectoral effect of investor sentiment depends
on the kind of sentiment under analysis. In this paper, we consider sport sentiment that, as
argued in the previous literature, is more likely to affect foreign investors than local investors
in the US. As a a result, the relationship between sport sentiment and the Financials sector
might be due to the relatively high liquidity that makes the Financials sector more attractive
to foreign investors. However, we believe that different kinds of investor sentiment (for
instance, those based on meteorological conditions, seasonal diseases, temperature or lunar
phases) might affect the behavior of other types of investors (for instance, local investors in
the US) and, thus, might have a more pronounced effect on sectors (or stocks) other than
Financials. This topic is left for future research.
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